Vladimir Putin’s steering of the Russian ship in a decidedly conservative direction has been attributed by political commentators to be an opportunistic move to garner the support of the influential Russian Orthodox Church as well as encompassing the support of those who hanker for the more traditional Tsarist era, - pre-Bolshevik Revolution - an event which abruptly and devastatingly ended a centuries-old civilisation.
Although appearing to embrace conservatism, today’s Russia seems to be a mass of contradictions especially with the emergence of a so-called Bolshevik party and its admiration of both Stalin and Tsarist Russia. It seems to be a type of domestic conservatism and Nationalism, combined with revolutionary and imperialistic inclinations.
What impact then do the ideas of the intelligentsia have on the course Putin’s set the country on?
Enter on the national stage Aleksandr Dugin - the man known by the moniker – Putin’s Brain- or the lesser used one -Putin’s Rasputin.
Dugin, a philosopher and political scientist, earned two doctorates in Sociology and Philosophy, has close ties with the Kremlin and Russian Military and is a prolific author. His best known ones are Foundations of Geopolitics and the Fourth Political Theory.
Politically he focuses on the restoration of the Russian Empire through the unification of Russian speaking territories, the former Soviet Republics Georgia and Ukraine being examples, as well as Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Dugin is seen as the driving conceptual force behind the annexation of Crimea. He represents the ‘war party’ a division in the heart of the leadership concerning Ukraine. He has said ‘The Russian Renaissance can only stop by Kiev.’
Dugin has been labelled a fascist and anti-communist, he explains in an article titled ‘Fascism-Borderless and Red’ - announcing the arrival of a ‘genuine, true, radically revolutionary and consistent fascism in Russia. Although not the racist and chauvinist aspects of National Socialism he claims, but Russian fascism, a combination of natural national conservatism with a desire for true changes’. In his journal Elementary he glorified both Tsarist and Stalinist Russia and he was the National Bolshevik Party’s earliest member. A part of the hard-line nationalist NBP members he supported broke away to form the more right-wing, anti-liberal, anti-left, aggressive nationalist organisation, National Bolshevik Front.
Dugin claims to be especially disproving of liberalism and the West, particularly American hegemony. He asserts ‘we are on the side of Stalin and the Soviet Union’.
Dugin’s dream is of a Russian strategic alliance with European and Middle Eastern States, primarily Iran, as well as those of a ‘Turkic-Slavic alliance in the Eurasian sphere which has become popular amongst Nationalistic circles in Turkey, notably among alleged members of the Ergenekon network. He also advocates for a Russo-Arab alliance.
He has also stated ‘Eurasia and Russia, remains the staging area of a new anti-bourgeois, anti-American revolution. The rejection of Atlanticism, strategic control of the USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us’.
Dugin does appear to be a man to watch, one with direct influence on the Kremlin, although he has criticised Putin for being ‘too soft’ on Ukraine, when he did not aid the pro-Russian insurgents after the Ukrainian Army’s early July 2014 offensive.
He obviously doesn’t always get his way, with Putin being the last word, but the possibility that Russia will take an increasing hard-line in the future cannot be ruled out. Especially with regard to the deteriorating relationship with the US.
According to Alexander Nevzorov, ‘if we had Kurginyan and Dugin instead of Putin, there would have been hell for all of us to pay, they would have unleashed a European and World War without a shadow of a doubt, without considering consequences at all.’
In another publication Nevzorov stated ‘Beliefs are only proven by being under bullets, another prescription does not exist. I do not understand why Milonov and Dugin are not there yet.’
In part 2 we take another look at the enigma of Aleksandr Dugin and his possible effect on Russia.