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The current spasm of conflict in Yemen has left close to 1,000 people dead, as of writing on 22 April. The fighting involves three groups, broadly, including two primary fighting groups. On the one side is a coalition of 13 nations, which are either directly or indirectly involved in the fighting, which are led by Saudi Arabia and who are battling in support of President Hadi, the legitimate leader of the Yemeni state. On the other side are a militia group, the Houthis, who are Shiite Muslim and who are supported by a number of Yemeni military sectors, including those linked to the former president, Ali Saleh. The Houthis are also, allegedly, supported and supplied by Iran, Saudi Arabia’s regional rival. The third group, which both sides are opposed to, are the Islamist extremists, notably, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the recently formed Islamic State (IS) branch in Yemen.
The fighting is currently based on four broad fronts. In the north, is a low-level tit-for-tat cross border skirmish between the Saudis and Houthis. In the south, pro-Hadi forces, including southern separatists, are participating in a ground conflict in Aden and a number of other nearby cities. Further east, AQAP, pro-Hadi and pro-Houthi forces are battling in multiple areas while, finally, the Saudi’s and their Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies, are conducting an air war against the Houthi and pro-Saleh forces in cities across the country, including the capital, Sanaa. On the Saudis part, their involvement stems from a March request from the Hadi administration to intervene in Yemen after the Houthis launched an offensive towards Aden. Aden, of course, was the city Hadi fled to when the Houthis accelerated their agitation (ongoing since September) in the capital. The Houthis, for their part, are convinced that the Hadi administration is corrupt, overly influenced by Saudi Arabia and the West and is a slight on the 2011 revolution, which ousted Saleh. The oft cited example of regional autonomy has also been regularly presented as a motivating factor. Following the National Dialogue Process (NDP), the Houthis were angered when one of the proposals was for the creation of new regions which, effectively, split their territory in the north. This NDC proposal precipitated a wave of Houthi assaults towards the capital that culiminated in their capture of Sanaa in September 2014. The support of Iran, a fellow Shiite entity, has also been presented as a possible motivating factor for the Houthis somewhat aggressive stance since 2012.
The end game scenario of the current altercation is unclear; however, all indications are that an extensive ground war may be in the pipeline. Numerous allied states have promised ground forces for any eventual Saudi invasion while the Saudis, in the meantime, have deployed half of their regular military force to the Yemen border and mobilised their National Guard. This, in and of itself, should be enough to give the game away and/or hint at a possible next step in this developing crisis.
The disposition of forces in Yemen is also noteworthy. The Saudi-backed coalition is predominantly Sunni while the Houthis are Shiite and appear to be supported by Iran, the primary Shiite power in the region. Saudi Arabia, supported by the West, has a set number of goals. It wants to stabilise the region, prevent Iran from gaining influence in countries bordering it and ensure that survival of the ruling Al-Saud dynasty. To do so, it has supported Sunni states and groupings across the Middle East, including in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Egypt and Libya. It is no surprise that in three of these areas, Iran has appeared as a backer of the Saudis preffered choice. Yemen, now, stands out as yet another proxy field from which the great geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran will play out. This has led, inexorably, to many to conclude that Yemen is yet another step towards the cataclysmic sectarian war and , quite possibly, the trigger that leads the region to this ultimate battle. I, for one, can find no reason not to hold a similar position.
The fighting is currently based on four broad fronts. In the north, is a low-level tit-for-tat cross border skirmish between the Saudis and Houthis. In the south, pro-Hadi forces, including southern separatists, are participating in a ground conflict in Aden and a number of other nearby cities. Further east, AQAP, pro-Hadi and pro-Houthi forces are battling in multiple areas while, finally, the Saudi’s and their Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies, are conducting an air war against the Houthi and pro-Saleh forces in cities across the country, including the capital, Sanaa. On the Saudis part, their involvement stems from a March request from the Hadi administration to intervene in Yemen after the Houthis launched an offensive towards Aden. Aden, of course, was the city Hadi fled to when the Houthis accelerated their agitation (ongoing since September) in the capital. The Houthis, for their part, are convinced that the Hadi administration is corrupt, overly influenced by Saudi Arabia and the West and is a slight on the 2011 revolution, which ousted Saleh. The oft cited example of regional autonomy has also been regularly presented as a motivating factor. Following the National Dialogue Process (NDP), the Houthis were angered when one of the proposals was for the creation of new regions which, effectively, split their territory in the north. This NDC proposal precipitated a wave of Houthi assaults towards the capital that culiminated in their capture of Sanaa in September 2014. The support of Iran, a fellow Shiite entity, has also been presented as a possible motivating factor for the Houthis somewhat aggressive stance since 2012.
The end game scenario of the current altercation is unclear; however, all indications are that an extensive ground war may be in the pipeline. Numerous allied states have promised ground forces for any eventual Saudi invasion while the Saudis, in the meantime, have deployed half of their regular military force to the Yemen border and mobilised their National Guard. This, in and of itself, should be enough to give the game away and/or hint at a possible next step in this developing crisis.
The disposition of forces in Yemen is also noteworthy. The Saudi-backed coalition is predominantly Sunni while the Houthis are Shiite and appear to be supported by Iran, the primary Shiite power in the region. Saudi Arabia, supported by the West, has a set number of goals. It wants to stabilise the region, prevent Iran from gaining influence in countries bordering it and ensure that survival of the ruling Al-Saud dynasty. To do so, it has supported Sunni states and groupings across the Middle East, including in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Egypt and Libya. It is no surprise that in three of these areas, Iran has appeared as a backer of the Saudis preffered choice. Yemen, now, stands out as yet another proxy field from which the great geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran will play out. This has led, inexorably, to many to conclude that Yemen is yet another step towards the cataclysmic sectarian war and , quite possibly, the trigger that leads the region to this ultimate battle. I, for one, can find no reason not to hold a similar position.
